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Why Serbia should be granted candidate status for the European Union
At a conference in Berlin in July 2011, the Serbian
president Boris Tadic said that Serbia has been at the
margins of European integration for long enough
and that it is now time to move into the centre.
While this statement is certainly true, it cannot be
achieved without conditions. The government in
Belgrade has done much in the recent months and
years to prove its seriousness about moving towards
membership in the European Union. The arrest of
the alleged war criminals Karadzic, Mladic and
Hadzic show the commitment that the name of the
winning coalition,“For a European Serbia” from the
last parliamentary election promised. The coalition
managed to fulfil the conditions
set by the EU and most promi-
nently the Dutch government
for an implementation of the
Stabilisation and Association
Agreement (SAA). So far the
majority of member states have
ratified the SAA and it is likely to enter into force by
2012. The interim agreement on trade and trade-
related issues as part of the SAA already entered
into force in February 2010. Two months before, in
December 2009, the visa regime between Serbia and
the EU was abolished. In the same month, Belgrade
submitted an official application for membership to
the European Union.
Crisis in Northern Kosovo
Despite advice from the European Commission to
give Serbia candidate status, the heads of state and
government are likely to ignore this recommenda-
tion. The reason for this is the ongoing dispute at the
Serbian-Kosovar border that recently caused several
injuries, among them soldiers from the Kosovo
Force (KFOR) that have been stationed in Kosovo
since the end of the war in 1999. Following the uni-
lateral declaration of independence from Prishtina
in February 2008, the situation has remained rela-
tively calm, with NATO even considering reducing
the current 6200 soldiers to 2500. In July 2011, the
dispute about border control violently erupted when
Kosovar police forces attempted to gain control over
the border crossing points in Northern Kosovo
where the majority is comprised of ethnic Serbs. The
border crossings were held by Serbian members of
the Kosovo police together with members of the
EU’s rule of law mission EULEX. The attempt was,
according to Kosovar Prime
Minister HashimThaci, to esta-
blish law and order. Since the
declaration of independence,
Belgrade banned all imports of
goods from Kosovo. By taking
control over the border cross-
ing points in Northern Kosovo, Prishtina aimed to
enforce a similar ban on Serbian goods. During
these clashes, KFOR troops took control over the
two crossing points in Brnjak and Jarinje in North
Kosovo. Kosovar Serbian protesters erected several
road blocks that have been dismantled by the KFOR
troops. In the following weeks, new road blocks
were erected causing several incidents between
NATO soldiers and Kosovar Serbian protesters.
Until now the situation remains unresolved, despite
the efforts of representatives of the Serbian govern-
ment, the Kosovar government and the internation-
al community. A compromise suggested that the
border crossings should be controlled by one official
from both ethnicities and an international represen-
tative from EULEX. The Kosovo Serbs initially rejec-
ted this Belgrade-backed plan, however, recently the
“Despite advice from the European
Commission to give Serbia candida-
te status, the heads of state and
government are likely to ignore this
recommendation.“
At the EU summit in Brussels on 8-9 December 2011, the heads of state and government will decide about the
way forward for the European integration of the Western Balkan states. While it is expected that the membership
contract with Croatia will be signed and negotiations with Montenegro could be opened, the candidate status for
Serbia is uncertain. Despite the recent border disputes with Kosovo, Brussels should grant Belgrade this status
and even consider opening negotiations. This is not only important for the further democratic development in the
region but also a sign that the EU is able to continue its role as a stabiliser for the region in times when internal
problems set the agenda in Brussels.
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dismantling of the road blocks seems to have started.
Belgrade appears to have only limited influence on
the Kosovo Serbs, a conclusion illustrated by the fact
a majority of the 50,000 Serbians of Northern
Kosovo recently unsuccessfully applied for Russian
citizenshåip, hoping that if the home country does
not protect them, maybe Moscow would. Neverthe-
less, some EU member states like Germany doubt
this and demand a final resolution of the conflict in
exchange for the candidate status from Serbia.
Regardless if Belgrade can influence the Northern
Kosovo Serbs or not, the problem certainly needs to
be solved, however, an incident in a province of a
neighbouring state – because this is what Kosovo is
to Germany, a sovereign country – should not
account for the whole country and its aspirations
towards membership in the EU.
Upcoming parliamentary elections
Denying Serbia candidate status would most likely
influence the upcoming parliamentary election to be
held in spring 2012. The pro-
European coalition has shown
its commitment and Tadic also
noted that this has been achie-
ved only in conjunction with
enormous personal risks. Na-
tionalist forces are still very strong in Serbia and do
not refrain from using force against government
officials as the assassination of then prime minister
Zoran Dindic in 2003 has shown. While failing to
become a candidate country will not directly threat-
en the current government, it could give the nation-
alist parties ammunition for their electoral cam-
paign, especially when the Kosovo issue can be
exploited. Although it would be wrong to solely give
Serbia candidate status so that pro-European forces
will win the election – something Brussels essential-
ly did before the last election in 2008, by signing the
SAA shortly before the ballot – it is also a wrong sig-
nal to not grant the status due to the recent crisis in
Kosovo. The current government has proven that
when getting positive signals from the EU it is
determined to fulfil its obligations. Parts of the “For
a European Serbia” coalition have already indicated
that they might be willing to accept Kosovar inde-
pendence in exchange for moving closer to EU
membership. While Brussels should not bring anot-
her unresolved border dispute into the European
Union, a final solution does not have to be found
before stating membership negotiations as the suc-
cessful resolution of the border dispute between
Slovenia and Croatia during the course of delibera-
tions have proven.
Deepening and widening
While economic policy is the top priority on the
agenda of the upcoming Brussels summit, the deci-
sion about the further integration of the Western
Balkan states is listed under “any other business”.
Given the current situation within the European
Union and especially the Eurozone, this is not
surprising and certainly comprehensible. Never-
theless, the European project goes further than cur-
rent institutional problems. The ever closer union is
only one part that also has to be accompanied by an
ever wider union given that all Western Balkan
countries are potential candidate countries since the
Feira European Council in 2001 reiterated by the
summit in Thessaloniki 2003. In order to provide a
consistent foreign policy, the EU should consider
giving Serbia candidate status and also start negotia-
tions if Brussels decides to do so with Montenegro
since the original reason why
Podgorica could advance
towards the EU and Belgrade
could not – full compliance
with the ICTY – disappeared
with the arrest of Hadzic.
Moreover, by starting negotiations with Serbia, the
efforts so far undertaken by the government in
Belgrade to implement the acquis communautaire
would be put to a real test. The government has
adopted an ambitious plan to fully implement the
acquis by 2012 and, with the screening procedure
starting with the negotiations with the EU, a sub-
stantial track record of the reforms and achieve-
ments by the coalitions would become visible. In
other words, instead of fulfilling obligations
concerning the past, Serbia would finally be respon-
sible for reforms for the future.
Brussels commitment to foreign policy in times
of internal crisis
Whereas the timing of Serbia’s candidate status at
first appears to be a question for the internal politics
of Serbia, given the upcoming parliamentary elec-
tions in spring 2012, it is ultimately a question whether
the EU is still able to continue its core idea – unifi-
cation of the whole European continent – or only
able to focus on internal problems like the current
crisis of the Eurozone. Brussels should have an in-
terest in avoiding the loss of credibility on the
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“Denying Serbia candidate status
would most likely influence the upco-
ming parliamentary election to be held
in spring 2012.“
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Balkans. Furthermore, the current crisis of the
Eurozone must not lead to a neglect of the EU’s
foreign policy. Brussels has to be an active actor in
the Western Balkans region and not only a reactive
force as it has been in the 1990s. This does not mean
that not granting candidate status to Serbia will lead
to violent clashes again or that a candidate status
could prevent this. However, active support proves a
commitment to the core idea of the EU. Exclusively
core member states within the EU might be needed
to solve the Euro crisis, but a ‘Core Europe’ must not
replace the  central idea of European integration.
Recommendations
1. Although enlargement is cur-
rently not on top of the EU’s
agenda, the heads of state and
government should give Serbia
candidate status at the summit
in Brussels. The general opinion
of a EU membership has been
declining recently in Serbia.
While the population, especially since the global
financial and economic crisis, seems to be more con-
cerned about the economic development in Serbia
than about Kosovo, this topic can easily be exploited
especially in times of election.
2. Furthermore, the EU should also consider open-
ing accession talks with Belgrade as soon as pos-
sible. The screening process would help to evaluate
the National Programme for the Adoption of the
Acquis of Serbia, which set out to have a full com-
patibility by the year 2012. Beyond the headline-
grabbing arresting of war cri-
minals or reaching border
dispute compromises, this
would be a real test of Serbia’s
commitment and therefore will
hold the government even
more accountable for demo-
cratic development in Serbia.
3. Part of the deal has to be
that Belgrade normalises its
relationship with Prishtina.
While the Serbian government
is currently not able (and to a
certain extent also not willing)
to accept the independence of
Kosovo, the status question
might become less relevant in
the course of the accession talks. For the time being,
a relationship between Serbia and Kosovo similar to
the inter-German relations after Ostpolitik could
serve as a model. A mid-term solution for the prob-
lem could be that Belgrade does not recognise the
independence of Kosovo but respects its territorial
integrity. Prishtina in return should grant the nor-
thern part a certain degree of autonomy.
It is an unfavourable time for enlargement, however,
if the EU fails to grant candidate status, Serbia will
remain at the margins of European integration. This
not only endangers the political development of the
country in the upcoming election, but also the stabi-
lity of the whole region. Not
only is it time for Belgrade to
move into the centre of Euro-
pean integration, but also time
for Brussels to strengthen its
centre of gravity. Widening is
not a process that should only
follow deepening, but rather be
seen as an interdependent pro-
cess where one cannot be done without the other if
the European project shall successfully continue.
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“Whereas the timing of Serbia’s can-
didate status at first appears to be a
question for the internal politics of
Serbia, it is ultimately a question
whether the EU is still able to conti-
nue its core idea – unification of
the whole European continent.“
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